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steps to legalize that dissolution prior to filing for bankruptcy if they want to reduce the risk that
their bankruptcy estates will be substantively consolidated.
I.

Despite a lack of Statutory Authority, the Supreme Court has affirmed Substantive
Consolidation’s Use as an Equitable Remedy.
Substantive consolidation is not expressly provided for in title 11 of the United States

Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”). Nevertheless, it is well established that a bankruptcy court has
the authority to order substantive consolidation. Most courts justify substantive consolidation by
relying on section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, which states in relevant part that a bankruptcy
court “may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of this title.”2 Some courts, however, rely on section 1123 of the Bankruptcy Code,
which “explicitly permits implementation of plans of reorganization through ‘merger or
consolidation of the debtor with one or more persons.’”3
Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp. signifies the first time that the Supreme Court
gave substantive consolidation its approval when it affirmed a district court’s order consolidating
the estates of an individual debtor with the debtor’s corporation.4 In considering the propriety of
substantive consolidation, the Court examined the individual debtor’s motive for creating the
corporation and their relationship.5 The Court found that “in this case, the corporation is formed
in order to continue the bankrupt’s business, where the bankrupt remains in control, and where
the effect of the transfer is to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors.”6 In addition, the Court
found that the relationship between the individual debtor and the corporation was so similar that
2

11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012).
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 105.09 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2009), available at
LEXIS, 2-105 Collier on Bankruptcy P 105.09 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(C)).
4
Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941); see also In re Reider, 31 F.3d at 1105 (noting
that “[i]n 1940, the Supreme Court gave its tacit approval to this equitable power to substantively consolidate two
estates”).
5
Sampsell, 313 U.S. at 218.
6
Id.
3
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neither could claim to be “separate and insulated” from the other in the proceedings.7 After
reaching this conclusion, the Court affirmed the order consolidating the estates of the debtor and
his corporation.8 Since Sampsell, courts on all levels have recognized substantive
consolidation’s use as an appropriate remedy.9
II.

Substantive Consolidation Originated in the Corporate Setting.
Following the Supreme Court’s approval of substantive consolidation in Sampsell, courts

began to substantively consolidate where there was fraud on the individual debtor’s part in
creating or using the corporation.10 In these original cases, courts “applied essentially an alter
ego or pierce the corporate veil test in assessing the propriety of substantive consolidation.”11
Eventually, courts substantively consolidated the bankruptcy estates of corporations and
subsidiaries as well.12 Regardless of the corporation/shareholder or corporation/corporation
configuration, the circuit courts began to develop different tests to determine whether to order
substantive consolidation.13
Currently, there is a lack of consensus among several of the circuits concerning the
appropriate test to utilize in evaluating a motion for substantive consolidation.14 One of two

7

Id.
Id. at 221.
9
See, e.g., Cent. Tr. Co., Rochester, N.Y. v. Official Creditors’ Com. Of Geiger Enter., Inc., 454 U.S. 354 (1982)
(holding that a debtor corporation could not substantively consolidate the bankruptcy estate that it created under the
1898 version of the Bankruptcy Act with the bankruptcy estates it created for subsidiaries under the 1978
Bankruptcy Act).
10
In re Reider, 31 F.3d at 1105.
11
Id.
12
See 2-105 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 105.09.
13
See id. (stressing that “in substantive consolidation cases, the relationship between the legal entities as to which
consolidation is sought is far more important than their form”).
14
See In re Bonham, 229 F.3d 750, 765 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that “[n]o uniform guideline for determining when
to order substantive consolidation has emerged”); see also 2-105 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 105.09 (providing
that “substantive consolidation has received a variety of interpretations among the circuits. . .until the [Supreme]
Court acts, the applicable test. . .will be determined by geography as much as by logic”).
8
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emerging tests has been adopted by circuit courts as they analyze this issue for the first time.15
In F.D.I.C. v. Colonial Realty Co., the Second Circuit made the decision to use the test
previously developed in In re Augie/Restivo Co., Ltd., that it had articulated for chapter 11 cases
in a chapter 7 context as well.16 Under this two-part factor-based test, a court must analyze “(i)
whether creditors dealt with the entities as a single economic unit and ‘did not rely on their
separate identity in extending credit’; or (ii) whether the affairs of the debtors are so entangled
that consolidation will benefit all creditors.’”17 A court may order substantive consolidation if
either factor can be established.18
In In re Auto-Train Corp., Inc., the D.C. Circuit adopted a three-part burden-shifting test
that has emerged as an alternative to the Augie-Restivo test.19 The standard, referred to as the
Eastgroup analysis by the Eleventh Circuit, imposes the initial burden on the proponent to “show
not only a substantial identity between the entities to be consolidated, but also that consolidation
is necessary to avoid some harm or realize some benefit.”20 If the proponent can make this
showing, the burden shifts to the opposing party to establish “that it relied on the separate credit
of one of the entities and that it will be prejudiced by the consolidation.”21 If the opposing party
fulfilled its burden, a motion for substantive consolidation may be granted if the court determines
the “benefits of consolidation ‘heavily’ outweigh the harm.”22 Despite these two competing

15

See In re Bonham, 229 F.3d at 765.
F.D.I.C. v. Colonial Realty Co., 966 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing In re Augie/Restivo Co., Ltd., 860 F.2d 515
(2d Cir. 1988)).
17
F.D.I.C., 966 F.2d at 61 (quoting In re Augie/Restivo Co., Ltd., 860 F.2d at 518).
18
See In re Bonham, 229 F.3d at 765.
19
See id. (citing In re Auto-Train Corp., Inc., 810 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
20
In re Auto-Train Corp., Inc., 810 F.2d at 276; In re Reider, 31 F.3d at 1107 (citing Eastgroup Properties v.
Southern Motel Assoc., Ltd., 935 F.2d 245 (11th Cir. 1991)).
21
Id.
22
Id. (quoting In re Continental Vending Mach. Corp., 517 F.2d 997, 1001 (2d Cir. 1975)).
16
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standards, the circuit courts are undivided in holding that substantive consolidation is,
essentially, a remedy of last resort.23
III.

In re Reider and Subsequent Decisions Have Recognized the Power of Bankruptcy
Courts to Substantively Consolidate the Estates of Debtor Spouses.
A.

In In re Reider, Eleventh Circuit is the first Court of Appeals to Expand
Substantive Consolidation into the Consumer Context.

Prior to making the decision to expand substantive consolidation into the consumer
context in In re Reider, the Eleventh Circuit examined the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code with respect to the joint administration of spouses’ bankruptcy estates.24 Following this
examination, the court then evaluated the different substantive consolidation tests used to
determine which was most applicable.25 Section 302(a) of the Bankruptcy Code states “[a] joint
case. . .is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a single petition. . .by an
individual that may be a debtor. . .and such individual’s spouse.”26 If the court orders joint
administration after considering the best interests of the parties, the spouses’ bankruptcy estates
will be jointly administered, but joint administration does not automatically equate to
consolidation.27 Joint administration is for the sake of judicial efficiency while consolidation
actually affects the rights of the creditors, debtors, and trustee.28
Following the court’s order of joint administration, Section 302(b) provides “the court
shall determine the extent, if any, to which the debtors’ estates should be consolidated.”29 In In

23

See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 210 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting “there appears nearly unanimous consensus
that it is a remedy to be used ‘sparingly’” (citation omitted)).
24
In re Reider, 31 F.3d at 1105.
25
Id.
26
11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012).
27
See 2-302 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 302.01.
28
See In re McCulley, 150 B.R. 358 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1993) (providing that “[a]bsent a Court Order to consolidate,
joint administration has absolutely no impact on the legal rights and obligations of the Debtor, Creditors, or the
Trustee”).
29
11 U.S.C. §302(b) (2012).
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re Reider, the debtor spouses filed for joint administration of their bankruptcy estates, but
opposed consolidation.30 Despite this opposition, one of their creditors argued that their estates
should be consolidated because “the case had been filed as joint,” “the trustee had intermingled
the funds,” “the debtors had not [] set out a breakdown of the separate assets and liabilities, and
“the assets and liabilities of the two debtors were so intermingled that they could not be
separated.”31 The bankruptcy court agreed with the creditor and issued an order consolidating
the debtor spouses’ estates, which was affirmed by the district court.32 On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that a modified version of the Eastgroup formulation, its own adaptation of the
D.C. Circuit’s burden-shifting approach, was be the most appropriate test to apply.33 The court
articulated the test as a two-prong analysis, “a court must determine: (1) whether there is a
substantial identity between the assets, liabilities, and handling of financial affairs between the
debtor spouses; and (2) whether harm will result from permitting or denying consolidation.”34
Upon application of this test to the facts, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that the
bankruptcy court accorded too much weight to the debtors’ joint filing and listing of assets.35
Despite not affirming the order of consolidation, the court’s commentary reflected the possibility
of substantively consolidating debtor spouses’ estates.
After the Eleventh Circuit’s expansion of substantive consolidation into the consumer
context, the Six, Fourth, Third, and Second circuits followed suit by recognizing its potential
use.36 In In re Fishell, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order affirming the

30

In re Reider, 31 F.3d at 1104.
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 1108 (citing Eastgroup Properties v. Southern Motel Ass’n, Ltd., 935 F.2d 245 (11th Cir. 1991)).
34
In re Reider, 31 F.3d at 1108.
35
Id. at 1109 (holding that “the bankruptcy court erred by placing undue reliance upon the fact that the debtor
spouses’ estates had been jointly administered”).
36
See supra text accompanying note 1.
31
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bankruptcy court’s denial of substantive consolidation, concluding that the debtor spouses’
motion was “an attempt by the debtors to wrest control of the distribution of ‘their assets’ from
the Chapter 7 trustee and take a second bite at the reorganization apple.”37 The Fourth Circuit, in
In re Bunker, did not disturb the bankruptcy court’s order consolidating the estates of debtor
spouses, finding that it was not pertinent to the issue on appeal.38 Similarly, in In re Brannon
and in Wornick v. Gaffney, substantive consolidation was not an issue on appeal, but the Third
and Second Circuits, respectively, recognized its potential in the spousal context.39
B.

Eighth Circuit is the most recent circuit court to consider the issue of substantive
consolidation in the spousal context.

In Boellner v. Dowden,40 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held
that it was within the discretion of the bankruptcy court to order substantive consolidation of
spouses’ bankruptcy estates when they file separate petitions for chapter 7 bankruptcy.41 In
doing so, it relied on the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in In re Reider.42 However, in contrast to the
Eleventh Circuit in In re Reider and most other substantive consolidation opinions, the Boellner
court notably omitted a cautionary statement about substantive consolidation’s sparing use.43
This is particularly significant considering the court’s arguable expansion of a bankruptcy court’s

37

In re Fishell, 111 F.3d at 3 (6th Cir. 1997).
In re Bunker, 312 F.3d at 148 (4th Cir. 2002) (concluding that “[t]he spouses may take the exemption
nonwithstanding the joint administration or substantive consolidation of their individual bankruptcy estates”).
39
In re Brannon, 476 F.3d at N. 2 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that “[t]he court may [] determine to substantively
consolidate the cases. . .but that did not occur here”); Wornick v. Gaffney, 544 F.3d at 491 (2d Cir. 2008)
(acknowledging that a joint petition by debtor spouses does not affect any legal rights unless consolidated).
40
612 Fed.Appx. 399 (8th Cir. 2015).
41
Id. at 400.
42
Id. at 401.
43
See, e.g., In re Reider, 31 F.3d at 1109 (cautioning that [s]ubstantive consolidation should be invoked ‘sparingly’
where any creditor or debtor objects to its use” (citation omitted)); see also 2-105 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶
105.09 (finding that “[i]n general, courts have adopted the view that ‘power to consolidate should be used
sparingly’” (citation omitted)).
38
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power to consolidate bankruptcy estates. Furthermore, it became the first circuit court to actually
affirm an order substantively consolidating the separate estates of debtor spouses.44
In contrast to the debtor spouses in previous cases, the debtor spouses in Boellner were
living separately and filed separate petitions for chapter 7 bankruptcy.45 In response to the
separate petitions, the trustee filed a motion for joint administration and substantive
consolidation, arguing that “allowing the Boellners to maintain separate bankruptcy estates
would prejudice the creditors because the Boellners could then stack federal and state
exemptions.”46 The debtor spouses opposed the trustee’s motion, emphasizing that not only did
they live separately, but also they had separate assets and liabilities.47 The debtor spouses
conceded that filing separate petitions permitted the debtor husband to claim federal exemptions
for his annuities and IRAs under section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code while permitting the
debtor wife to claim a state exemption for her house.48 After determining that the benefits of
consolidation outweighed the harm and that prejudice would result to creditors if separate
bankruptcy estates were maintained, the bankruptcy court ordered joint administration and
substantive consolidation.49 The trustee removed the debtor spouses’ appeal from the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel to the district court, which affirmed the order of the bankruptcy
court and denied the debtors’ motion for reconsideration.50

44

But see In re Bunker, supra, (declining to review the bankruptcy court’s order of substantive consolidation
because it was not raised on appeal).
45
Boellner, 616 Fed.Appx. at 400.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 400-401; see also 11 USC §522(d) (2012); Ark. Const. art. IX, § 3.
49
Boellner, 616 Fed.Appx. at 401.
50
Id.
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On appeal, the Eighth Circuit considered whether the bankruptcy court abused its
discretion in ordering substantive consolidation of the debtor spouses’ bankruptcy estates.51 In
its analysis, the Eighth Circuit articulated a definition, “[s]ubstantive consolidation of two
bankruptcy estates ‘means assets and liabilities of both debtors are pooled,’” and adopted the
two-prong test established by the Eleventh Circuit in In re Reider.52 The court concluded that
the first prong, substantial identity, was fulfilled because the debtor wife owned the home while
the debtor husband owned the household goods, and they both had jointly withdrawn funds from
IRAs.53 The court then concluded that the second prong, harm to creditors, was satisfied as well
because if the debtor wife was permitted to claim a state exemption for her home and the debtor
husband was permitted to claim federal exemptions for his annuities and IRAs, “their separate
estates would have significantly less value than if their cases were substantively consolidated.”54
After determining that the two prongs of the In re Reider analysis were fulfilled, the court
affirmed the order of substantive consolidation.55
Boellner represents the continued expansion of substantive consolidation into the noncorporate context. In doing so, the Eighth Circuit added legitimacy to the notion that the In re
Reider standard is the appropriate one to use when substantive consolidation of the bankruptcy
estates of debtor spouses is being evaluated – the only standard that has yet to be used by circuit
courts in such a context. Furthermore, Boellner demonstrates that there continues to be a split
among the circuit courts between the factor-based approach originally articulated by the Second
Circuit and the D.C. Circuit’s burden-shifting approach. Even though the Supreme Court has

51

Id.
Id. (quoting In re N.S. Garrott & Sons, 48 B.R. 13, 17 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1984)).
53
Boellner, 616 Fed.Appx. at 401.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 402.
52
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recognized the legitimacy of substantive consolidation as an equitable remedy, it has yet to
indicate which method of analysis is preferable.56 Regardless, it is questionable that when the
Supreme Court gave its approval of the power of bankruptcy courts to substantively consolidate
in Sampsell that it foresaw it being used to consolidate the estates of debtor spouses that were no
longer living together and had filed for bankruptcy separately.
Conclusion
Debtors that are considering filing for bankruptcy and are living separately from their
spouse should consider the affect of the Boellner decision, especially if they live in the Eighth
Circuit. According to Boellner, a bankruptcy court may force consolidation in such a situation,
which, in contrast to just joint administration, affects the rights of all those involved. It would be
wise for a debtor to legalize their separation in some form, whether legal separation or divorce,
thereby providing evidence for the court that there is no longer a “substantial identity” between
the spouses. Moreover, it would also be helpful to ensure that the debtors’ financial statements
indicate that they have completely separate assets and liabilities. Most importantly, debtors
should not try to manipulate the bankruptcy system in a way that potentially prejudices creditors,
such as attempting to stack exemptions as the debtors did in Boellner.

56

See 2-105 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 105.09 (observing that “[t]hese divergent views can be reconciled only by
the Supreme Court”).
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